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BRITISH AGENTS
IN

AFGHANISTAN.

INa letter addressed to the '' Times," on the 23rd of
November last, the Duke of Argyll made the following
statement :;' " General assurances mere given to Shere AX (in
1869) that from time to time we should give him
such assi~~taace
and support as the circumstances of
the case might seem, in our judgment, to justlfy and
require.
" It may well be asked if this was enough to satisfy
the Ameey as a substitute for all the demands he had
made-for the treaty offensive and defensive, for the
gr~aranteeagainst domestic enemies, for the assurance
of his succession, f o r the annual subsidy? No. There
was one more concession which Lord Mayo made, and
made willingly. He promised to the Ameer ' that no
European officers would be placed as Residents in hie
cities.' '
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t Colonel Burne's Note, 24 April 1877, p. 174, Afghanistul,
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the Dttke of Argyll bears testimony* to the fact that,
in the early part of 1869, on first assuming the Triceroyalty, Lord Mayo, on his part, recog~iserl~
the
utilif!/ of having a11 European official at Cnbul, hut
considered t1hatthe British Gorennnent could, " n.it11ootI sencling, nt p/*esast,ally European official to Cabul,
exercise sufficient influence over him (Shere dli) to
keep him oil the most anlicnble terms wit11 us."? His
Grace also shoxs, correctly enough, t'hat Lord ~ I ~ I . ? J - o
was a t that time opposed to our taking "any clirect
part in the internal affairs of Afghanistan;" and that
he did not tWei2, maut any " Resident at Cablll, or
political influence in his (Shere Ali's) kingdom,"
although lie fully appreciated the mlne of " obtaining
accurate infor~nationas to the events that occur in
Ccntrnl Asia."
I n deducing from these facts tllnt Lord filaj-o recognised that 'cO1le of the g ~ e a :a~l~-antagcs
t
to be cLerired
fro111 t?le approaching conferellce aoulcl be the opportI~ll1ityit v-ould afford him of satisfj%lg the ihleer
that we did not ~5-antto press any Residents upon
him," $ the Duke of Argyll falls into error. Equally
so xheu he states, vith emplmsis, that tlicrc waa
"one more concession ~ l l i c l l LORI ;\layo ~u:~dc,
and made ~~illingly-he p~olliisedto the A~neer' that
no European officers shonlcl be placed as Residnita
in his cities.' "
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The Eastern Question," rol. ii. p. 253.

t Ibid., vol. ii. pp. 556, 257.
j: Ibid., vol. ii. p. 264.
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informed of all affairs," and to match the disbursement
of the subsidy; they were not to interfere in any may
'' in the internal administration of the country."
I n the various conferences between the Punjab and
Afghan authorities, in connection with this agreement, it became apparent that the presence of British
officers in afghanistan was not so unpalatable to the
afghans as had been anticipated, although aan influential
party, including Dosb Mahomed himself, had so strong
an obiection to their location at the capital itself that
the clause of the agreement, so far as it affected
Cabul, remained a dead letter.
The follonkg passages from some portions of the
correspondence of that period -ivill sl~owthe general
feeling of the Afghans of 185'7 on this subject.
'On the 7th of January, 185'7, Mr. Lawrence addressed Lord Canning's Government as follows :-*
c c Hafizjeet on this asked whether it mas our purpose
to send British officers to Afghanistan. It was stated
that, provided Government consented to assist the
Ameer, it mould be a condition that such officers
should be deputed,
and receive the countenance and
*
support of His Highness. But that they would
duty
exercise no authority nor any command. Their
- - would be to attend the Ameer, or any of his sons
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* No. 23A., 7 January 1847, p. 68. Epitome of Cabul Correspondence, published in Lahore Government Press. 1863.
t t'Hafizjee, son of the Mir Wais, one of the most influential
men in the kingdom, whose sanctity is so great and popular (fronl
uniting the Sayyad and Sunni in one) that it is supposed his disciples in Cabul and the Kohistan could give away the throne."
(Colonel Edwardes, p. 53, Bid.)

he might entrust with the charge of distinct
portion of the Afghan force, and to give advice when
required, and to obtain all the information which our
Governmellt might require, for which the Ameer would
be bonnd to afford every facility. It was distinctly
explained that they would neither interfere in the
administration, nor instruct nor pay the troops. To
this the Ameer and Sirdars expressed their assent, and,
indeed, appeared as if they perceived the reasonableness of the arrangement. It was a point on which
some difficulty had been anticipated ; but the readiness
with mliich it mas agreed to was remarkable."
He again m o t e on the 15th of January, 1857 :-*
" It may be expedient here t o observe that so far
from the Afghan Chiefs raising objection, or in any
way indicating an ~mwillingnesst o see British officers
in Cabul, they had actually shown by their remarks
that they mere prepazed to allow our officers to interfere in s manner much more decided than was contemplated. Thus, while the Chief Commissioner was
explaining to the Chiefs the particular duties which
Government required of our officers, Hafizjee interrupted his remarks by saying, ' they ' (the officers)
'can give the Ameer advice, they can instruct and
drill the troops.' 'I'here can be no doubt, therefore,
that the
and his Sirdars were quite prepared
for the presence of our officers, in the event of any
subsidy being allowed; at the same time, it is now
@qualbclear that such an arrangement is distasteful

* No.48 A., 15 January 1857,p. 75, ijio?.
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These records bear testimony, of themselves, to the
general accuracy of the following Note* recorded b y
m~selfin 1877 :c C I can fully corroborate all that Captain Grey and
Dr. Bellen say as to the willingness of the Arneer at
Umballa to considel*the subject of British Agencies in
Afghanistan had he received encouragement t o enter
officially into the subject, and had his expectations of
being granted a new treaty been responded to. The
same evidence which certified to Shere Mi's desire f o r
a treaty certified to his willingness to receive British
Agents. If the one was imaginary, SO was the other.
Being at that time in Lord Mayo's full confidence, I
can testify to the fact that both he himself and those
associated with him accepted the evidence of the
Arneer's wishes in both cases as genuine. The time
had, howe~er, not arrived for the consideration of
either question ; and the orders of Her Majesty's
Government, added to Lord Mayo's own personal
views as t o the requirement of the moment, and the
danger of suddenly deviating from the policy of the
Viceroy who had just left India, induced him to discourage the o6cial mention of either matter at the
conferences. Moreover, His Highness made no formal
proposition on the subject, hoping, as we were led t o
believe, that it might come first from the Viceroy, and
thereby ensure him better terms."
But, although, as Private Secretary to the Viceroy
in 1869, I was in Lord Mayo's " full confidence,"
+
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I do not desire to place my own recollections or
memoranda in too great prominence. I am con-
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tent to substantiate my statement above quoted by
means of docnments which were received and recorded,
at the time, in the official archives of the Indian
Foreign Office, copies of which documents have been,
since the Umballa durbar,* in my possession.
I beg, in the first instance, to refer to a record of a
Council held by the AmeeT at Lahore on the 16th
March, 1869, whilst en. ~ o u t eto Umballa.
This record was furnished by X. 'Y., a f a i t h f ~ ~serl
vant who possessed, and still possesses, the confidence
of the Government of India, and whose accuracy in
similar cases has borne the test of years and has not
been found wanting. At this Council the following conversations between Shere Ali and his confidential advisers took
place :" The Ameer then said,-' S h o ~ ~the
l d British authorities propose that a European Agent be stationed at
Oabul itself, although I am myself agreeable to such
arrangement, but the people of Oabul are turbulent
and mischievous-should such European Agent be injured in any way, which God forbid, I would be disgraced. The late Ameer, my father, on these very
considerations, refused to have a European Agent at
his capital. But if an Agent be located in the interior,
at places like Candahar, or Balkh, or Herat, there

* They have also been published, in whole or in part, in recent
Blue Books.

t

would be no objection. Such an arrangement would
be advantageous to both Governments ; for bstance,
at the present time the people of the Lower Seistan
have commenced. encroachments on the Candahar
boundaries. Lower Seistan was formerly always attached to Afghanistan, and has been occupied by
Persia only since a short time. We are not aware
mhat agreement exists between the British and Persian Governments regarding Lower Seistan. If there
should be a European Agent on the border, he would
be possessed of the necessary information, and would
be at hand to consult regarding affairs relating to
territories beyond the borders .' "
" ALl the members approved of what the Ameer h a d
said,"
I beg, in the second place, to refer to a N o t e
written, at the time, by the Under Secretary in the
Foreign Department of the Government of India. This
Note is dated 26th March, 1869, and was received a n d
officially recorded as a genuine document. It r a n as
follows :" The Viceroy may possibly desire to have without
delay the following details which I have learnt f r o m
Punjab officials in the course of conversation yesterday
and to-day. The Ameer is prepared, if asked, to allow
European Agents at Candahar, Herat, and Balkh,
but he would raise difficulties, though probably not
insuperable ones, about such an officer at Cabul."
I beg, in the third place, to refer to a conversation
between Major Grey and Shere Ali, in which allusion
was made by the b e e r to the same subject.
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The record of this conversation was equally received
and recorded at the time as genuine. Before quoting
it, however, it may be expedient to describe the exact
position hold by Major Grey at the Umballa conference, and the opinion which Lord Mayo held of that
officer. I feel bound, in justice to Captain Grey, to
take this course, as some unmerited doubts have been
cast on his position a t Umballa, and the accuracy of
his statements made then and since.
Major 'Grey is an officer of recognised experience
and ability. For his general intelligence and complete
knowledge of Persian, Lord Mayo selected him as
special interpreter at Umballa between His Excellency
and Shere Ali. Of Lord Mayo's personal opinion of
him I need only quote the following statement* from
many others of a similar kind :" Captain Grey, who knows them (the Afghans)
all thoroughly, and is steady and wise, and entirely in
our confidence (as he was interpreter at Umballa)
keeps up a purely unofficial correspondence with Nur
Mahomed, the Minister. This is useful."
No one in 1869 ventured to call in question this
officer's veracity; and in that year the following
statement, signed and verified by the Foreign Secretary, was handed in to the Viceroy, was accepted as
genuine, and was recorded in the archives of the
Foreign Office. It is dated 31st March 1869, and
runs as follows :" The Ameer is prepared to act on what he may see

* Lord Mayo, 17 October 1869.

is the nature of the friendship the British pr3pose to
afford him. If, as hitherto, merely acknowledging the
ruler of Cabul de fncto, well and good, but if prepared
to acknowledge and support him and the heir he may
point out (the contrary having produced the present
troubles), tlhere is nothing he will not accede to.
" He is open to any proposition for securing his
northern border. While doubtful of any Russian power
for aggression for some years to come, still he thinks
precautions should he taken ; he mould collstruct forts
on his own part, or under our superintendence, and
admit European garrisons if ever desired; he would
gladly see an Agent or engineer superintendent in
Balkh, Herat, or anymhere but actually in Cabul,
which might lead tc tjhe supposition of hs being a
puppet ."
But there is yet another officer's evidence in favour
of this view-an
officer who was attached to the
Ameer's personal staff as his int'erpreter ; an officer
who mas a personal friend of Shere Ali's, who was
on the most intimate terms with him, who had a
thorough knowledge of the Pushtoo language, and
could hardly retain a wrong impression of his many
conversations with His Highness. This officer, Dr.
Bellevr, mtting in 1875,says that the impression left
on his mind at Umballa was that " Shere Ali would
gladly see Agents at Herat and Candahar."*
I have, however, no wish t o rely solely on the
evidenoe thus given ; I therefore may be permitted t o

* gee p. 273, Afghanistan, No: 1.

f

quote Lord Mayo's own words, when he wrote* t o
Sir Henry Rawliuson after the Umballa durbar,
treating the question of an Agency at Herat as a new
one which did not take a prominent place at the Umballa confe&nce ; testifying, at the same time, to Shere
Ali's willingness, although evincing, in his opinion,
no positive anxiety, to receive British Agencies a t
Herat, Candahar, or Balkh, if desired.
Lord Mayo writes :c c It was repeatedly explained to him (Shere Ali)
that we should never send a British soldier to assist
him against his rebellious subjects. . . . . I own I
am very sceptical as to the prop14iet-y of placing a
British Resident at Herat, but I mill reserve my
opinion until I hear the reasons. As a r~ile,I am
totally opposed to sending Emopean Politicals to any
Asiatic town if it can be avoided ; they are a dangerous
class, and many a misfortune can be traced to their
honest but misplaced activity. I do not believe, from
what the Ameer said at Umballa, that he would offer
any opposition to an English Agent being placed a t
Candahar, Herat, or Balkh, though he mo111d strongly
object to the appearance of one at CaBul. But I do
not think he wished for it allywhere, fearing the effect
it might have on his own subjects."
When, in 1875, the question of an Agency a t Herat
unexpectedly caused a difference of opinion between
Her Majesty's Home Government and that of India,
Ldrd Northbrook's Government endeavoured to shake

* Lord Mayo t o Sir Henry Rawfinson, 10 June 1869.

the evidence given and accepted as genuine in 1869.
But it failed to do so to any material extent. Major
Grey's evidence, indeed, became more emphatic than
that given in 1869 ; for he says,' " the Ameer did freely
consent to the appointment of British officeis in Balkh,
Herat, or anywhere but actually at Cabul;" and the
Government of India could not but acknowledge that
Captain Grey's evidence was not to be ignored. For,
in addressing the Secretary of State for Indiat in
that year, they said :"On the whole, however, we think that either
the Ameer himself or his Minister, Noor Mahorned
Shah, did, in confidential communication with Captain
Grey, express a readiness to accept at some future
time, not far distant, the presence of British Agents
in Afghanistan, excepting Cabul itself."
Passing from this correspondence, we come to evidence of a more
date, on which the Duke of
Argyll places much reliance-that of Mr. Seton Karr,
who, in 1869, filled the position of Foreign Secretary to
the Government of India. Mr. Seton Karr's evidence
is culled from his private memorandum book. That
evidence is not on official record, either in India, or at
the India Office ; and I give prominence to this fact
as showing the secondary importance to be attached
to it. It is an axiom of Indian administration to
record every word, every h e , every expression of importance, which passes between a Viceroy and an Asiatic

* See p. 144, Bfghanistan, No. 1.

t

To Secretary of State, 7 June 1875, p. 129, Afghanistan, No. 1.

potentate, or a Foreign Secretary and an Asiatic
minister. This is a point on which most scrupulou~
care is taken. It is necessary to existing, and vital
to future, interests; and, such being the case, no
responsible Government can justifiably accept extracts
from private memoranda given ten yeam after an
event, unless fully supported by the official records
of the date to which those memoranda may refer.
Mr. Seton E a r r is a distinguished Indian servant,
whose veracity, honour, and ability, are not to be impeached. But to what, after all, does his testimony
amount ? Why, merely30 substantiate that of Captain
Grey, vie. that the Ameer did not want a Resident
a t Cahul, and to a complete negation of the solemn
guarantee on which the Dake of Argyll relies. I
give his own words.
' ( I .) Mr. Seton Earr's letter to Lord Lawrence,
dated 18th November, 1878.
This is what he says to Lord Lawrence :" As instructed by Lord Mayo, I did broach (to the
Ameer) the subject of an English Resident at Chbul.
Both he and his Minister clearly intimated that they
could not accede to this step. It would be viewed
with suspicion, they said, by a strong party at Cabul.
It would excite prejudice and hostility; if anything
happened to the Resident, the Ameer would be blamed ;
and many similar arguments. He certainly did add
he might have no strong objectio~zsto
that, perso~~ally,
a Resident, but urged that his chiefs and nobles would
resent the presencq of an Englishman, and that he
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that this latter expression was merely meant to soften
down his refusal." Indeed, from the Ameer's manner, as
well as from that of his Minister, I judged that he disliked this idea as much as anyone, and had no wish for
any English political officer. The subject was not again
p~ressed,and Lord Mayo never, I think, apprehended
that the proposal would find acceptance. ' My communications with the Ameer and with Nur Mahommed
were long and frequent." I noted down these results
at the time. I have frequently thought over the
matter since, and I am quite certain of my facts."
. (2.) Mr. Seton Kayr's letter to the Under Secretary
of State for India, dated 10th December, 18'78:'< I repeat that I was distinctly empowered by Lord
Mayo to ask the Ameer whether he would consent to
an English Resident (at Cabul), and his reply was that
though personally he might not object, it ' would do
him harm in the eyes of his people,' and he and his
Ministers used other arguments to the safme effect.
This was by me reported to Lord Mayo in the presence
I

* I n a letter addressed t o me on the 4th of April 1869, Mr.
Seton Karr, referring to his conversations with Nur Mahomed,
wrote" I could not find an opportunity last night to tell His Excellency that the Ameer, through his Minister, clearly understands
the wishes of the Government about trade and the passes," &c.
I n a Note of the same date, enclosed to me for Lord Mayo's
information, Captain Grey made a further report of his private
conversations with the b e e r on matters which Lord Mayo
desired him (Captain Grey) to discuss with His Highness, in the
course of which Shere Ali " expressed his readiness to meet the
British Government half -way in every matter that interested
them."
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of Lord Sandhurst, and the subject was at once dropped
by the Viceroy's express desire."
The Duke of Argyll, in a letter to Mr. Seton Karr,
dated the 14th December (published in the c c Daily
News " of the 18th idem), congratulates him on having
spoken the truth; believing, apparently, tliat his
evidence had disproved the statement that the Ameer
was not unwilling in 1869 to receive European Agents
in his country (except at Cabul), and that Mr. Seton
Karr had given a denial to this assertion.
But all Mr. Seton Ram apparently adduces from
his private memoranda, is the fact stated by Major
Grey and others in 1869, that the Ameer would
" raise difficulties, although probably
not insuperable ones," to the location of a Resident at Cabul.
Mr. Seton Karr-no
doubt inadvertently-omitted
to state that the evidence tendered and accepted
as genuine at Umballa showed that Shere Ali was not
unwilling to have considered the question of the
location of British officers elsewhere than at the
capital, had he been asked, or had the matter been
looked upon as of sufficient importance (which it was
not) to have been urged upon him by the Viceroy.
That Lord Mayo did not really desire, in 1869, to
send British officers to Cabul, or to any othey part of
Afghanistan, as permanent Agents, or, in other words,
to exercise, in, the state of things then existing, interference in the " internal affairs of the country," is
evident from his published despatches and from his
letters quoted by the Duke of Argyll. But before
each of his conferences with Shere Ali, he went over
2 *

with Major Grey, in my presence, the ground whicb
he intended to take up in the event of the Ameer
bringing the subject f ormard ; and his whole object
was,. whilst making up his mind to refuse to allow
officers to go then to Afghanistan, yet to leave his
hands entirely free as to sending them at any futura
time. I am sure Major Grey will bear me out in this
statement; it may also be in his recollection that the
Ameer took a sudden whim into his head as to taking
his friend Colonel Chxrles Chamberlain back with him to
Cabul-a step to which Lord Mayo declined to accede.
Whilst the Ameer was not unwilling, the Viceroy
was not willing, t o see British officers in Afghanistan.
Lord Mayo only wished to establish what he called an
" intermediate " policy. He had no wish to interfere,
nor was there at that time any object in doing so, mith
the internal politics of the country or with the family
quarrels of the Barakzaies; consequently at his personal conferences with Shere Bli, he gave him no
encouragement to bring forward the question of
Agents, or other measures involving responsibility in
the internal affairs of Afghanistan.
Lord Mayo's own views in this respect are contained
in his private correspondence with the Duke of Argyll
and others.
Thus, he wrote, on the 2nd March 1869,"I am entirely opposed to any attempt to take any
direct part in the internal affairs of Afghanistan."
On the 3rd of June 1869 he wrote,"As the invasioll by a foreign Europeall Power of
his territory was never alluded to by the Ameer or me,
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our course of action, in the event of such an occurrence taking place, is not affected by anything that
took place at Umballa."
R e again wrote, on the 10th June 1869," It was repeatedly explained to him (Shere Ali)
that we should never send a British soldier to assist
him against his rebellious subjects."
And again, on the 2nd July 1871," Then (if Afghanistan were threatened from without) it might be indispensable to the safety of India
that we should support the Ruler of Cabul with men,
money, and arms ; but the Ameer was told at Umballa
that no British officer or soldier would ever cross his
frontier to he@ him to put down a rebellion. Afghans
do not fight when they can murder or bribe. As our
officers do not indulge in the latter business, they
would probably, if employed in Afghanistan, be disposed of by assassination, in which case, I think, the.
British lion would naturally seek revenge. I think
we should wait a long time before we encouraged civil
war in Afghanistan by giving either oficers o r money
to assist any BaraTcsai i n conquering another."
Again, in regard to the general line of policy to be
pursued in future contingencies towards Afghanistan
and other neigh bouring States, he wrote :-*
" I have never met a sensible politician who held
the opinion that our true policy is to await an invasion of India within our frontiers. I have frequently
laid down what I believe t o be the cardinal points of

* Memorandum, 29 December 1871.
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Anglo-Indian policy. They may be summed up in a
few words. We should establish with our frontier
States of Khelat, Afghanistan, Yarkund, Nepal, and
Burmah, intimate relations of friendship ; we should
make them feel that, though we are all-powerful, we
desire to support their nationality; that when necessity
arises we might assist them with money, arms, and
even, perhaps, in certain eventualities, with men. We
could thus create in them outworks of our Empire; and
assuring them that the days of annexation are pa,ssed,
ma,ke them know that they have everything to g a i n
and nothing to lose by endeavouring to deserve o u r
favour and support. Further, we should strenuously
oppose any attempt to neutralise &thoseterritories in
the European sense, or to sanction or invite the interference of any European Power in their affairs. IIt
may take years to develope this policy. I t is contrary
to what has been hitherto our course in India ; but if
it is once established, recognised, and appreciated, o u r
Empire mill be comparatively secure."
These were the general views held consistently by
Lord Mayo during his Indian administration. He had
no wish in 1869 to send British Agents to Afghanistan,
knowing that to do so at that moment was t o c o u r t
risk for no corresponding benefit. They could t h e n
only have gone to interfere with domestic politics, o r
to support the b e e r ' s dynasty. Afghanistan w a s
not threatened from without. Although Russia h a d
made rapid conquests in Central Asia, she had n o t
approached inconveniently near t o the Afghan border ;
and Persia showed no symptom of aggression on

Herat. Consequently the discussions a t Umballa
between Lord Mayo and Rhere Ali dealt rather
with Afghanistan recovering from domestic brawls,
than with afghanistan fearing the aggressions of
a foreign power. This state of things gave a very
distinct colour to the Umballa proceedings, and made
all that mas then said and done essentially different
from transactions of a more recent date.
Lord Mayo was not, however, satisfied with the
mode in which we were represented in Afghanistan,
and he, therefore, authorised the Foreign Secretary to
confer tentatively with Nur Mahomed on the subject.
I give the question put, and the answer given, in the
two conferences held on this subject on the 1st and
3rd of April, 1869 :-1st April. " Question. Would
the Ameer sanction Native Agents - in Afghanistan,
either as visitors or as permanent residents, supposing the British Government wished it ? " Reply.
" The Minister
remarked that he did not wish
to commit himself, and asked rather anxiously
whether European Agents were intended, observing,
a t the same time, that it was no use to send any but
Mahommedans ; Hindoos were of no good at all. He
begged that his reply might not be put on paper. He
said that he first distinctly wished to ascertain the
Ameer's sentiments. . . . . He added, he was
looking far forward, and the day might come when
d
the ' RUSH' would arrive, and the Ameer w o ~ ~ lbe
glad not only of British officers as Agents, but of
arms and troops to back them."
3trclApril. c g Referring to the points which were

reserved in the conversation of April lst, 1869, the
Minister said that there was no occasion to include
Ghazni as a place of residence for a British Agent, as
Ghazni mas included in Cabul. The Ameer was ready
to have a writer to accompany him wherever he moved,
and to allow of men in Turkestan and Balkh, when
the country mas more settled."
" At the close of the interview the Foreign Secretary
took the Minister apart and clearly explained to him
His Excellency's instructions that, under no circumstances, mas the Ameer to expect that British troops
would cross the border to put down civil mar or
domestic contention. This intimation was repeated to
the Minister by the Foreign Secretary at a subsequent
interview, and the Minister's reply on both occasions
was clear and satisfactory as to the Ameer's full
ulzderstandizg on this point."
I n alluding to the coilversations, Lord Mayo*
said :" Two interviews have taken place between the confidential adviser of His Highness Syud Noor Mahomed
Shah and our Foreign Secretary. At these interviews
various matters of importance mere fully discussed,
and the means whereby trade with Afghanistan could
be encouraged, and additional measures for securing
the peace of the frontier could be promoted, were
carefully considered. An opportunity was also taken,
at the same time, to inform the Minister, in the

*
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clearest and most explicit terms, that the British
Government would always abstain filom any direct
interference in the internal aBairs of ~fghanistan,and
t h a t under no circumstances could BGtish troops or
British oficela be employed across the frontier in
quelling civil contentions or domestic strife."
Lord Mayo's object at Umballa was to keep his
Government f r e e from engagements and pledges of
a n y kind except those contained in the letter addressed
t o Shere Ali, dated 31st March 1869,* which intimated
t o him that whilst the Briiish Government did not
desire to interfere in the " internal affairs of Afghanistan," yet that it would "view with severe displeasure"
any attempts on the part of his rivals to disturb his
position as Ruler of Cabul and rekindle civil war;
and that it would further endeavour, from time to
time, " by such means as circumstances may require,"
t o strengthen the Government of His Highness.
Finding, however, that the Home Government
did not view these pledges with favour, he justified
them in some detail in a subsequent despatch,? describing his general policy a t Umballa in the following
words :" The policy that we had endeavoured to establish
may be termed an intermediate one ; that is to say, that
while we distilictly intimated to the Ameer that, under
no circumsta~~ces,
should a British soldier ever cross
his frontier to assist him in coercing his rebelLious
subjects; that no European officers would be placed

*
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as Residents in his cities; that no fixed subsidy or
money allowance would be given for any named period;
that no promise of assistance in other ways would be
made ; that no treaty would be entered into, obliging
us under every circumstance to recognise him and his
descendants rulers of Afghanistan, yet that we were
prepared by the most open and absolute present
recognition, and by every public evidence of friendly
disposition, of respect for his character and interest in
his fortunes, to give him all the moral support in our
power, and that in addition we were willing to assist
him with money, arms, ammunition, native artificers,
and in other ways, whenever we deemed it possible or
desirable to do so."
I admit that the phrase in this letter touching the
" European officers" may be construed to bear, to
some extent, the interpretation placed upon it by the
Duke of h g y l l , in the light of Lord Mayo's private
letter of the 3rd of June 1869.
But I affirm with confidence, on the evidence of
Lord Mayo's other letters and the official records of
1869, that no pledge of the nature suggested was
given to the Ameer at Umballa. It was Shere Ali
who, on first arrival at Umballal, expressed his
'c willingness " to receive British Agents at his outposts, and his absolute " wish" to receive them if
Russia ever approached nearer to him. I t was Lord
Mayo who knew that such a measure, if adopted
by him, would draw from the Ameer further pressure for a treaty on the lines of the agreement of
1857, and commit him to support the Ameer's dynasty.
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The subjeot came, therefore, into the category of what
the Ameer was not to have.
I much regret, by any testimony of my own, to
cast a shadow of doubt on any expressions used by
Lord Mayo in his private letters. But these expressions must be read, as I said before, in the light of
the officialrecords of 1869, and of the spirit of that
great and good Viceroy's whole policy. I feel sure
that no one more than Lord Mayo himself, were he
now alive, would regret the meaning attached to
words which he intended merely to apply t o the
fact that he had no desire to force a "Resident
at Cabul" on the Ameer, or to send officers across
the frontier to countenance Shere Ali's family quarrels, and commit the British Government to support
his dynasty in the state of thngs existing at that
p eriod.
Is it ~ o s s i b l ethat Lord Mayo, whose sole object at
Umballa was to establish an intermediate policy capable
of future development, and to keep his hands free in
regard to future contingencies, would tie to all time
his own action, and the action of his successors, by
a pledge in the sense understood by the Duke of
Axgyll? Could he have done so without specifio
instructions from the Home Government? Had so
solemn a pledge been given, would it not have been as
solemnly placed on official record 2 Would it not have
been given personally by the Viceroy to Shere Ali?
Would not Shere Ali have mentioned it in subsequent
- transactions ? Would not Nur Mahomed have brought
it forward as an unanswerable argument to Lord North-

brook in 1873,* when his Foreign Secretary pressed on
that wily Asiatic the advantages of a permanent British
representative at Cabul ? Would he not equally have
given to such a pledge a prominent place in his arguments at the Peshawur Conference of 1877, and have
thereby effectually stopped all further discussion ?
Nur Mahomed certainly did constantly refer, both
in 1873 and 1877, to Lord Mayo's pledges to the
Ameer, but only in the sense that those pledges meant
an unconditional guarantee of protection without
return of any kind from Shere Ali-an
argument
successfully disproved both by Lord Northbrook and
Lord Lytton.
I t stands to reason that if the b e e r was not unwilling in 1869 to receive British Agents into his
country (except at Cabul), he would hardly have
devoted all his energies to obtain a concession, a
solemn pledge, to the contrary from Lord Mayo.
If the evidence, in regard to this willingness, of the
Viceroy's confidential interpreter, Major Grey; of the

* See Government of h d i a lett.er, para. 13, 10 May 1877, p. 162,
Af ghanistan, No. 1. It is remarkable that in none of the arguments
used by Nur Mahomed at any time was mention made of any pledge
given to the b e e r by Lord Mayo on the subject of Agents. It is
equally remarkable, as showing the slow rate of progression of
the Afghan nation, that Nur Mahomed repeated the same excuses
for delay, in regard to the question of British Agents in Afghanistan, as urged twenty years previously by Hafiz-ji. No wonder
the b e e r exclaimed at Peshawur, L L All people are advancing in
the arts of peace and civilization. It is only we dfghans who
remain the ignorant asses we have always been." (Commissioner
of Peshawur's Report, 12th March 1869).
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Ameer's friend and confidential i n t e r ~ r e t eDr.
~ , Bellew;
of the Viceroy's Private Secretary; and of Lord Mayo
himself; are collectively to be treated as inaccurate
and valueless, then I have nothing more to say. But
I venture to think that no after attempts to shake
our evidence, or to throw doubts on records accepted
afid oficially recorded in 1869, should be allowed
to weigh with any reasonable mind as against facts
established in that year, accepted by the Covernment of that day as genuine, and not doubted or
attempted to be shaken until many years afterwards.
If, on the other hand, our evidence is trustworthy,
then the argument now put forward that British
officers in Afghanistan were in 1869 the one dread
and abhorrence of Shere Ali. falls to the ground.
It is of course possible that Lord Mayo, when he
instructed Mr. Seton Karr to let the subject of a Resident at Calsul "drop," may have given him some
general authority to assure Nur Mahomed that he had
no wish to send an officer to Cabul against the Ameer's
wish. Admitting this, for the sake of argument, let
us examine for a few moments how the fact affects
the policy adopted since 1875-76, by Her Majesty's
present Government and the Viceroy.
The instructionst sent by Lord Salisbury to the
Governor-General of India on the 22nd January 1875,
made the establishment of a British Agency at Herat
(not a t Cabul) dependent on the " assent of the

* '(The Eastern Question,"
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Ameer," His illstructions of the 19th November
1875 pointed equally to the necessity of obtaining
the ccconcurrence" of the Ameer even in receiving
a temporary mission in his capital to confer on Ceiitral
Asian affairs. The instructions of the 28th February
1876, given to Lord Lytton, pointed equally to
a temporary mission to Cabul "to overcome the
Ameer's apparent reluctance," as reported by Lord
Northbrook, to the establishment of Agencies in
Afghanistan ; and to the offer of great and permanent
benefits, the only return for which benefits was to be
His Highness's consent to the placing of British
Agents in those parts of his dominions whence they
might best match the "course of events " outside his
dominions. There is certainly no sign in these papers
of any attempt to break solemn pledges, even had
they been given, or any desire to force Agents on
Shere M i " against his wish."
From my position as Private Secretary to Lord
Lytton, I am able to say from personal experience that
nothing could exceed, from the first moment he landed
in India, the patience with which that nobleman dealt
with Shere Ali, and the pains he took in carrying out
the instructions of the Home Government.
/ On arrival at Calcutta he arranged, with the
' unanimous
concui-rence of his Council, to send
his own aide-de-camp, Ressaldar Khanan Khan, to
the Ameer, charged with a letter and verbal messages to Shere Ali, informing him of his intention
t o depute Sir Levis Pelly temporarily to Cabul, or
to any other place convenient to His Highness,
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of the moment, for wording his communication in

this language, -urging the Ameer to reconsider his
position and the chances he was throwing a w a i of a
firm alliance with the British Government. T h a t
communicat,ion went to the Ameer, after careful and
at Simla, on the 8th of July
lengthened

'

After a delay of nearly two months, the Ameer
replied, still refusing to receive Sir Lewis Felly, b u t
pyoposing that the British Vakeel a t Cabul should b e
summoned to Simla to expound,the whole state of
affairs, and to hear what the Byitish Government had
to say to the Ameer. So reluctant was Lord Lytton
to treat the Ameer harshly or hastily, that he p u t
aside all his own wishes on the subject, and consented to this course. By the hand of this Vakeel
he entrusted, for communication to Shere Ali, an
Aide Memoire, dated 13th Oct. 1876. jf
This Aide Men~oil*einformed Shere Mi, clearly and
succinctly, of the great and liberal coiicessions t h e
British Government was prepared to grant him, and
of the reasonable return required by it for tliose
concessions.
.' 111 offering the Ameer these terms, viz. a treaty of
alliance, a dynastic and territorial guarantee, a n d
prospective financial and military aid, Lord Lytt80u
distinctly indicated, in conciliatory language, that he
had no desire to press Agents on the Ameer against
his wish. But it was clearly impossible to undertake
the weighty obligations, above noted, on behalf of the
b e e r unless His Highness, on his part, consented to
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accept the conditions offered to him; and this was all
that y a s intimated to Shere Ali. He was asked to
discuss the matter frankly, and he knew perfectly well
that the discussion would be a fair and reasonable one
on the part of the Indian authorities.
I n this Aide Memoi~eLord Lytton said, in effect,
" I am prepared to give you a treaty, guarantee your
dynasty, a large annual subsidy, and defence from
outward aggression, some of which benefits you desired
in 1869, some in 1873 ; if you desire them now, all I
ask in return is permission to establish a British
Agent at Herat or elsewhere on your frontier to watch
affairs beyond it. These officers are not to interfere with you. If they do, I will at once recall them."
In short, to be accurate, I give his own words.* He
said :A I authorise the Agent to tell the Ameer that I am
glad to find it in my power to relieve his mind from
many apprehensions as to my intentions, which appear
to have been caused by circumstances previous to
my assumption of the Government of India. I
autliorise the Agent to tell the Ameer that, if His
Highness wishes to make me his friend, I mill be a
warm and true, a fast and firm, friend to him, doing
all that is practically in my power to stand by him
in his difficulties, to cordially support him, to
strengthen his throne, to establish his dynasty, and to
confirm the succession in the person of his son Sirdar
Ab dullah an," 'etc.
I am, therefore, willing to give him rt treaty of
friendship and alliance, and also to afford him assistance
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m anns, men, and money, for the defence of his terri-

tory against unprovoked foreign invasion. I am
f urtller willing to give him immediate pecuniary
assistance, and to give to his son, Abdullah Jan, the
public recognition and support of the British Government*.
c c But I cannot do any one of these things unless
tlie Ameer is, on his part, equally willing to afford me
the practical means of assisting His Highness in the
protection of his frontier, by the residelice of a British
Agent st Herat, and at such other parts of that &ontier,
most exposed to danger from without, as may be
hereafter agreed upon.
" I do not even wish to embarrass the Ameer, whose
present difficulties I fully sympathise with, by carrying
out this arrangement until after the signature of a
Treaty of Alliance between us, on terms which ought
to satisfy His Highness of the perfect loyalty of our
friendship ; nor unt.il after the Ameer shall have had
tlie means of making known to his people that the
presence of a British Agent in Afghanistan signifies
tliat, lie is there without interfering in internal Stat'e
matters, as the firm supporter of the Arneer and of
the heir-apparent, to aid them with all the influence
and power of the British Government in defending
their country against foreign aggression, and t o discourage attempt,^ on the part of the disaffected t o
disturb its internal tranquillity or weaken the throne
of His Highness.
" It will be the duty of any such British Agents t o
watch the external affairs of the frontier, furnishing
timely and trustworthy intelligence thereof to the
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Ameer, as well as to the British Government. Should
the Ameer at any time have good cause to complain
that any British Agent has interfered in the internal
affairs of the country, the Agent will at once be
re-called.
c G I have no wish t o disturb the existing Native
Agency at Cabul, or to urge upon the Ameer the
reception of a permanent British Envoy at his Court,
if His Highness thinks that the presence of such an
Envoy would be a source of embarrassment to him.
But, in that case, I should, of course, expect that n o
obstacle be placed in the way of confidential communications between myself and His Highlieless, by means
of special Envoys, whenever the interests of the two
Governments may require them.
"In short, it is my object and desire that the treaty
of friendship and alliance, as well as the presence of
British Agents on the Afghan frontier, should be a
great strength and support to the Ameer, both at
home as well as abroad, and not a source of weakness
or embarrassment to him." .
In his personal conference with the British Vakeel
(who was individually opposed t o anything like his
own supersession in Afghanistan by temporary or permanent European Agents, and was not therefore a very
cordial co-operator) Lord Lytton used firm language.
It was necessary to show this official that whilst the
British Government did not desire to b'e unfriendly to
Shere Ali, it was not a Government to be trifled with.
The Ameer, d t e r all, was only asked to consider the
proposals laid before him; they were not being forced
upon him against his will. The Vakeel expressed,
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or at any rate pretended to express, his hope t h a t
Shere Ali would consent to consider the p'oposals s o
beneficial to his interests. But the hostile feeling a t
cabul against the British Government remained unchanged. On the return of the Vakeel, the Ameer,
under pretence of sickness, declined to receive h i m
for some weeks ; and when at last he did so it was
I
1
1 fact, there w a s
treachery at work, and a further delay of t h r e e
; during which the Viceroy vainly waited for a
reply to, or even a recognition of, his friendly Aide
a

A t length, on the 28th January, 1877, the P r i m e
Afinister, apparently as a reply to the Aide Memoil*e,
appeared a t Peshawclr. The Viceroy accepted the
deputation of this functionary as a token of Shere Ali's
acquiescence in the discussion of the important m a t t e r s
impending between them, on the bases of that dooument. But he was deceived. Nur Mahomed w a s t e d
meetings which lasted from the 30th of January to
the 19th February, 1877, in mere recriminations as
to past policy. He professed to have no authority to
discuss the bases of the Aide Memoire ; and all this time
Shere Ali continued his activity at Cabul in jehad!
matters ; and now openly, as he had hitherto d o n e
secretly, issued to the whole of the tribes down the
frontier, sunnuds obtained from the Akhoond of S w a t ,
authorising a religious war against the British Government, a war which might have broken out at a n y
moment. Shere Ali was in nightly conference with
Russian Agents ( affairs in Europe were critical, md
Lord Lytton was only too glad to take advantage of
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the death of Nur Mahomed to avoid further pitfalls.
He now found it impossible to pledge the British
Government to a treaty with a ruler who so clearly
showed the cloven hoof, and he put an end, on justifiable grounds, to a conference which co~lldin these
circumstances only end in mischief. Lord Lytton took
this step not only with the full concurrence of his
confidential advisers, but with the approval of the
Home Government.
Such is the history of the commencement and
termination of the Peshawur conference. Whilst the
Indian Viceroy was endeavouring to maintain satisfactory relations with the Ameer by offering hun aU
he was ever supposed to desire, in return for a concession to which he had not in former years indicated
insuperable objections, Shere AX was nourishing
against the British Government an inveterate animosity , an animosity rendered specially dangerous by
the past intimacy of his relations with General Kaufmann. This intimacy we were powerless to prevent
or counteract on account of our continued and accepted
exclusio~ifrom kfghanistan.
I n the then existing state of things in Europe it
became necessary for the Government of India to
remain passive, so long as it could do so with dignity,
and so long as the b e e r did not commit any further
overt act of hostility.
But all further efforts to strengthen our relations
with him, and to place them on a proper footing, were
useless ; and close intercourse between the two Governments practically ceased. Events had, in fact,
proved the correctness of Lord Mayo's view of Shere

Ai, as expressed in 1869 : " H e is a wilful, impulsive
man, leaving much to fate, and possessing few of
the generous qualities which characterised his father.
We cannot do much but watch him as well as we
can."
I confine my observations to facts in regard t o
which I have personal knowledge and recollection.
I do not, therefore, attempt to touch on those later
passages in our relations with Cabul which followed
the b e e r ' s reception, in July last, of a Russian
mission. I -do not write in any controversial spirit,
nor do I desire to do more than fulfil a duty to Lord
Mayo, to Major Grey, and to myself, in establishing
plain facts, and in removing doubts as to the accuracy
of our evidence.
I commend the plain facts set forth in this narrative
to the impartial consideration of fair-minded men,
before they accept as conclusive the Duke of Argyll's
estimate of the evidence, on particular points, of
witnesses opposed to his own view of the case; and
his criticisms on the action of the present Viceroy of
India and the Government which Lord Ly-tton has
faithfully served.

OWEN TUDOR BURNE.
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No~~.-Since writing the foregoing observations,
I have read a letter from Major Grey in the Times of
this day's date. As this letter strengthens my o m
evidence bearing on the Umballa conferences, I append
an extract from it :-

" I was confidentially employed by Lord Mayo on the occasion of
the meeting with Ameer Shere Ali W a n a t Umballa. I kept full
mmnoranda of everything that occurred, and these, with copies of
official reports, semi-official notes, and other papers that passed
through my hands, are now %eforeme.
" Mr. Seton Karr should be cognizant of what passed betweell
myself and the Ameer, or his Wazir, on various occasions during
the Umballa meeting, for I embodied the results of my interviews
in official reports, dated the 29th of March, the 3rd of April, and
the 4th of April, 1869. In the last of these, which was a summary
of my entire proceedings, I gave an abstract of the results of piivate
interviews with,the b e e r , or Wazir, on the 26th of March (before
the Viceroy's arrival); the 27th, 29th, 30th, and the 31st of March,
the 1st of April (three interviews), the 2nd of April (several
interviews), and the 3rd of April. I n the first of them is the
following passage :LC
He (the Ameer) is open to any proposition for securing his
northern border ; while doubtful of any Russian power for aggression for some years to come, still thinks precautions should be
taken; would construct forts on his own part or under our superintendence, and admit European garrisons if ever desired; would
gladly see an agent or engineer superintendent there (in Balkh),
Herat, or anywhere but actually in Cabul, which might lead to the
supposition of his being a puppet. There would be no danger to
such did they respect the Afghans and themselves.'
a My summary of the 4th of April, 1869, before referred to, states
that the Ameer was a party to this conversation, which occurred
previous to the first private interview of the b e e r with the Viceroy on the 29th of March. I obtained the Ameer's opinions on this
point with a view to fe matter being broached at that interview, which,
however,for some reason, was not done. The second private interview
between the Viceroy and Ameer occurred on the 3rd of April. My
official summary of the 4th of April, says :66 6 Ofi *day,
the 2nd of April, I had several interviews with
the beer and Wazir regarding points to be settled by the latter
with the Foreign Secretmy next morning (the discussionregarding

Reprinte
trade routes) and hp the Ameer at the next day's private
interview. '
c c 3lYpl+,rivate memoranda say on this head :c c In accordance with my representations, therefore, a new letter
was addressed to the Ameer, to which I was directed, if possible,
to obtain a reply of complete satisfaction, and also to arrive at a
&finite understanding with him on various other points noted
below,
which should be held the second private interview,
which shoulcl in a manner sanction and confirm the results of t h e
The points were : (1)That the b e e r should accede
to our deputation of native Agents whereveer me pleased-to this
the b e e r agreed and promised to assist them in every may ; (2)
to
whether the Ameer mas agreeable to the deputation of
~ n v o yat some future date-on this point the Ameer expressed
his willingness to receive an Envoy as soon as things had somewhat
down, anywhere save at Cabul, where he thought it would
affect his power with the people. . . .'
ctIn March, 1875,the Government of India inquired from m e
rnhcther my knowledge of what passed at Umballa led me to
believe that the Ameer would received British officers a t Herat o r
Candahar. I replied, giving the facts detailed above, and
I may note that the b e e r was at the time eager to meet o u r
views, or what he supposed to be such, and his whole attitude was
that of one anxious to please.' I further explained myself, semiofficially, as follows :l C' I n saying that he would receive an Envoy when matters had
soniewhat settled down, the Ameer referred, as I understood,
merely to hi9 immediate t~ouhles,Afghanistan being then still
much disturbed and a campaign in Turkestan imminent. I had
been instructed to ask whether the Ameer would receive an Envoy
" a t some future date."' He had agreed to the deputation of native
Agents " wherever we pleased," and his only stipulation regarding
British Envoys was that they should not reside in cabu1.j B
" Your obedient servant,
" H. GREY,Major, Political Agent and Superb" tendent, Bahawalpur State.
" Bahawalpur, Jan. 18."

,,

0. T. B.

24th Feb. 18'79.
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COLBURNySUNITED SERVICE HAGAZINE."

OUR SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER.

I Purpose confining my remarks upon the important subject of
the proposed rectification of o u r frontier line exclusively t o t h e
present military and political aspects of the question as, eq~lally
with Sir H. Norman, I should deprecate any reference t o the
policy which has preceded t h e present war in Afghanistan, for I
cannot but consider that t h e recent Parliamentary discussions have
been based upon a n entirely false issue, and that t h e question
which the Nation really required to be solved, was not whether
Lords Lawrence and Northbrooke in acting upon the traditional
motto of the British Foreign Office, viz., "Sufficient for the day i s
the evil thereof," failed to talne t h e necessary steps to establish our
influence a t Cabul, and,,hus to frustrate t h e aation of Russia, action
wLich, although fully anticipated by all who had carefully studied
the political strategy of t h a t great Power, both in Europe a r ~ d
Asia, may have been looked upon by t h e noble Lords and their
advisers as still probably very remote, but whether, when we found
tlint comtnunications were frequently passing between General
Kauffmann and Sher Ali and that, finally, a Russian Mission
had reacl~edthe capital and Russian influence become all-powerful
at the Arneey's Court, it was our duty, in the interests of our
Indian Empire a n d for the maintenance of peace both within and
without our borders, to supinely continue to pursue our policy of
masterly inactivity, or to a t once encleavonr to counteract t b e intrigues, I will not say of our enemy, b u t certainly of our political
rival, and to convince both her and the Ameer that, ml~ilst most
anxious t o maintain friendly relations with Afghanistan ancl most
unwilling to interfere in her internal affairs, we will brook no such
interference on t h e part of a Power that has already declared the
Ameer's territories to be beyond the sphere of her political action,
and which consequently can only have entered the Afghan Kingdon1 with t h e view of making i t either a, screen behind which she
might stealtllily mature her plans for clisquieting our frontier and
spreading sedition amongst our subjects, or a cat's-paw by which
she might effect h e r ends without running the risk of being called
to account in the event of her machinations proving unsuccessful.
mere military point of view, no one can dispute the accuracy
I
1
1
of the definition given by Sir Henry Norman of a scientific frontier,
but i t has to be considered :
1. Whether our present frontier answers to the definition.
2. Whether political considerations may not over-balance the
purely military in deciding what is to be t h e future frontier of our
Indian Empire.
General Norman rightly states that a good frontier is one t h a t
a would dot entail t h e employment for its defence of an excessive
force of troops, the occupation of which would not in other re-

.

spects be very costly ; the communications of which, along the
whole line, and with t h e bases in rear, are fairly easy and not liable
to interruptiou ; that it should, while in itself a strong bulwark,
have in its front obst'acles that would be very serious to a n attacking force, and yet not such as to preclude blows being delivered to
the front by the defenders."
Let us examine how far our present frontier accords with this
description. I t consists of a narrow tract of country about 500
miles in length, situated between a range of hills on the one side,
and a broad and rapid river on the other, hence t h e force by which
it is occupied can neither advance nor retreat ; i n fact, not only
does it not hold the glacis of t h e fortress, b u t it does not even
occupy the bastions and ravelins ; so long as it is needed only for
the defence of our territories against the attacks of mere predatory
tribes occup_vingthe hills, at the base of which the frontier line
runs, possibly its great defect is of trifling importance, for the
duty of our troops is confined almost entirely t o t h e pursuit of
raiders, who rarely wait to be attacked, but, as soon as they meet
with serious opposit-ion, hurriedly retire, in t h e hopes of escaping
to theit- fastnesses with the booty they have captured-the desire
for plunder being the sole inducement for their incursions; but
\voulil this be the case in the event of India being seriously
n~enncedwith invasion by a large and well-disciplined force, augmented by a horde of irregular troops, iustigated by the hopes of
participating in the spoils of the rich cities in the plains, t o become
auxiliaries in the attempt.
As all the passes tjo our front woulcl be closed against us, whilst
our whole line would be threatened, i t would be out of our power
either to advance, in order to strike a counter-blow, and act upon
the enemy's lines of communication, or t o concentrate our troops
upoil any given pojut, in order to meet him on his debouching
into the plains, at %he same time with his base extending from
Candahar t c Cabnl, and sheltered from observatioi~behind t h e
screen of mouutai n s, the invader might quiet,ly collect his
supplies and make his preparations for attacking us upon what
might appear our [nost unguarded point, his real attack being
accompanied aud concealed by feiuts directed upon other parts of
our line, as the weak columns employed for this purpose when
driven back, woultl simply retire upon strong positions in t h e
hills, from which me should have difficulty in dislodging them, a n d
from which they could always again advance, t h u s necessitating
our retaining corps of observation in front of each of the t h r e e
great passes-corps so far digttant from one another, as to prevent
their affording mutual support in case of attack, whilst, if o n e
should be overpowered, the safety of the other two would become
jeopardised, and they could only escape from their critical position by retiring across the Indus in the face OF a pursuing
euemy,
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Under the above circumstances, so long as we do not colnmand
the passes, it can hardly, I think, be maintained that our position
is such as to enable us to deliver couuter-attacks in case of war,
or calculated to secure our subjects from invasions from Afghans
or others, whether incited to aunoy us by Russia, or doing so of
their own mere motion.
If,on the contrary, the passes were in our possession, then, indeed, our positioll would be coroparatively strong. A few wellselected ~ositiolls, care full^ strengthened, would enable a snlall
force to Imr tile passage of a o army, whilst reinforce~nentscould,
when necessary, be furnished by the supporting columns l~catedin
the plains, and even although the out-posts might be eventually
compelled to retreat, time would be gained and, at the same time,
the hostile leader vould be cornl~elled, in sonie measure, to shew
his hand, and thus from the nature of the several attaclrs, our c o w
lllander would be able to Corm so~neidea as to the strength of thc
enemy and his prol-pilble plan of operations, and be alJe to judge of
the direction in which his iliain body is moving and, consequently,
of the point on wl~icllhis decisive blow is ii~teildedto be struck.
I t may be said that, by throwing our outposts too much in advance, they would be isolated from their supports, and their cornmunications likely to be cut off, whilst, if constraiued to retire, they
would have to do so through a difficult country, iu which they
would be liable to be harassed by hostile tribes. Now this observation would apply almost exclusively to the force stationed at the
further extremity of ,the Kh:-ber Pass ; of course, I presume that
some years must, in all probability, elapse ere any foreign power
could be in a position to place in line a sufficientlylarge army as to
absolutely imperil our north-west frontier, in the meanwhile, may
we not fairly hope that in the Indian Army, men may arise who,
cheered by the success that attei~dedthe efforts of the gallant and
lamented Outraln with the Bhcels, may devote their energies to
bringing under subjection some of the Hill tribes and, by a wisc
display of firmness, tempered with kindness, may succeed in conisrollingeven the most lawless, and converting those who now form
mere bands of robbers, into gallant. and loyal defenders of our
rule. Should this happy result be obtained, every mountain ridge
between Dhalia and Jumrood would become an important position, which t,he assailants could ouly carry with great loss; but
even supposing the hope were not re;~liued,and the tribes continued hostile, still the retreat need not prove difficult ; doubtless, the road-way bet~veenDhaka and Ali Musjid will be much
improved, the distance is but twenty-one miles, of which the last
thirteeu ouly would offer serious obstacles to the rapid inovements
of a retiring column ; but these obstacles would equally retard the
advance of the pursuing enemy, the more especially, as the heights
would be crowned by the slrirmishers of the force, detached from
the supports at the latter place, to cover the retreat. The defile
lia,rrows for the last three miles before reaching Ali Musjid, and

this portion of the Pass vould naturally be sharply contested,
vllilst the wlzole of the main-body stationed in the neigl~bourhood
of Jamrood could be brought into action in order to crush t h e
enemy whilst still embarrassed in the defile, and unable t o make
effective use of his artillery.
I n the Khurum Valley, the advance-post would be at the Peiwar
Psas, and the support-s at the Khurum fort and Thull, whilst, to
the south, the advanced post would be in the neighbourhood of
Quettah, or in the Fishin Valley, and the supports a t Jacobabad
~ h e i a c $ G b a z iXhan ; in neither case, apparently, would there
be any difficulty in maintaining the requisite communications. I n
tlle first, the out-post mould be connected with the fort by a
valley, offering no impediments t o a rapid advance ; and, in the
second, although the country through which the supports would
have to pass is rugged, and the distances are great, the population is friendly.
At present, even in time of peace, in addition to t h e troops
stationed in the Cis Indus districts of t h e Punjaub, a large garrison is needed a t Pesbawur, and a special corps, consistiilg of
(including the guides) six cavalry and twelve infantry regiments,
with sevel-a1 batteries of artillery, is posted along the frontier,
simply for the purpose of protecting our subjects from incursions
from across the border, and, so long as our relatious with the
Hill tribes remain on their present footing, no reduction can be
made in the strength of this force.
General Norman acknowledges that the oc~upationof the 7111~r u m Valley ~vouldrender our fronticr near Tllull more secure, but
he objects to our holding Quettah and the Ehyber Pass, principally upon the grouuds that it wollld be necessary for this purpose to withdraw from the gar~isoaof India a force which he
estimates at not less than '7,000 or 8,000 men. Surely this den~andis greatly over-estimated, when il; is 1-emembered that, in
1842, a garrison, entirely isolated, separated from our frontier not
merely Lp a range of mountains, but by the entire breadth of the
Punjaub, without any Europeari supports nearer than Kurnaul, a
garrison consisting of one regime lit of Europeau infantry, one
regi~neutof Native infantry, two squadrons of Native cavalry, a
1)att)eryof artillery, and some Native sappers and miners, nurnbering of all arms, about 1,800 men, not only held tlle position of
Jellitlabad throughout the winter, but eventually iuflicted a GI-ushi n g defeat upon their assailants, capturiug all their gulls and
camp-equipage, and compelliug them to raise the siege; this, too,
ats5~ time when the whole of Afghanistan, elated by the aunihilatiou of the Cabul gariison, had risen against us.
Under present circumstances, with a British cantonnlent at
Peshawur and British posts at Ali Musjid and Dhaka, a force of
the salne strength would, i n ordinary tirnes, bc sufficient t o galerisoli Jellult~l~tlrl,
especially as there seems to bo no reason to doubt
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the possibility of ollr being ullle to r;lisc from 111tA I-lill tril~es,for
througli tho lihyber
t h e protectoil of our line of co~iln~uuication
Pass, a body of militin, perfectly fi~ithf~ll
so long as tlleir pay m:iy
be regularly issuecl, slncl capable, under tlie co~ltrolof :l cardully
selected cornn~anrler,who would study their foeliugs and prejudices,
of becotnii~gan extremely valushle force, and the lever tllrfiugh
which we might extend cur influence generdly throughout, tlie
border. With t-he Khpber Pass it1 our hands. the force in the
Peshawur Division might, with possibly col~sitlerable advantage
a s regards the ht.alth of the British troops, furnish th5 necessary
detail t o form the Jellulrtbud garrison ; the duty of holcling the Khur u m Valley would be ent,rustecl to the Puriiaub frontier force, whilst
t h e addition of 21 wing of a Eu~-opealir;gituent to tlie forcc by
which Quettah has recently beell occupied, mould be sufficient to
render t h a t post capable of resisting auy unforeseen attack tllnt
might be made upon it,.
The Shami District, which is 5,500 feet above the sea, is state~l
t o have a delightful -climate, in' the hottest season of the year
(between J u n e and August), the highest range of the tliernio~netcr
being SO0, an agreeable contrast to that of Scinde, from mhicli tlle
mring might safely be withdrawn, whilst the men would benefit by
their removal from a district in which, during fire months in the
year, t h e heat is excessive, often reinaining a t 100' throughout
t h e night.
Under tohedispositioli al~p.)vesl~ecified,the estahlislimcut of t l ~ :
three advanced posts would l.)rove no great drain upon our Arrny
and, with the exception of the corps of Local Militia, of which t l ~ u
cost would not be excessive, need not elitail auy necessit,~for tlic
addition of a single soldier.
Any scheme for occupying the ranges of hills stretching fro111
Hazarah to Scinde and civilising the inhabitants by maill force,
might certainly be deemed visionary, and we lnllst trust, as Sir
H. Norman truly states, to time and such civilizing iufluences as
we can bring to bear to taliie and educate these mild people ;
b u t i t is a question wliethor cccupying rhe advanced positions
now proposed, we should not possess greater ficilities fur exerti n g our influence over .thew. This would be wore particulsrljr
t h e case as regirds t h e tribes in the neighbourhood of the Khyher
P a s s ancl Ehururn Valley, upon whoul tbe rery fact of our
holding posts in their rear would have a great. moral etfect.
The t a s k of spreading the blessings of order and civilization
amongst tho fierce races to be found in the borderland is, doubtless, deserving of serious consideration-it
is ou e involving great
labour
responsibility, and can only be carried out gradually ;
still i t is not beyorld the power of Great Britain, and, if successfully
must add materially t o tlie s:rl'ety a ~ i dprosperity of our o\vll provinces. Hitllcrtu our efforts tntrirrds this ~ n d
heell almost ciltircly cnlifined t,o isolilt,erl acts of pll~i~lluiellt
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repression, no systematic attempt has been made t o bring
thenl under our influence, and any such attempt would have
been utterly fruitless and, indeed, out of place, so long as they were
beyond t h e limits of our jurisdiction, and ackaowledged nominal
to another power, but once brought within our frontier line, means would not be wanting for the extension of our
intercourse with them, and we might fairly anticipate that, i n
the course of a few years, such intercourse, if conducted under
wise a n d strict supervision, ulight lead to happy results.
In his precis of the Art of War, General Jomini, in referring t o
lines of defence, states t h a t all chains of mountail~s and all great
defiles, protected by entrenchments upon their accessible points,
can be regarded as defensive lines, a t the same time, strategic
and tactical, since they serve to s u ~ p e n dduring several days the
march of an enemy, and oftea oblige hini t o deviate from his
direct march to seek a passage less difficult, in which case they
prove a n evident strategic advantage; but if the enemy aitaclis
them i n force to their front, then it is clear that they have also a
tactical advantage, since it is always more difficult to attack an
enemy in a post strong, both by nature and art, than to attack
him in a n open plain ; and he points out how the small fort of
Bard might have arrested the descent of the Army: of Napoleon
into the Valley of Aosta, and, equally, how a few good forts in the
defiles of the Balkans might have frustrated the Russian plans in
t h e campaign of 1829, remarking that, to concentrate firces in
t h e plains, is a natural system, but, in a country with difficult
gorges, it is to deliver the keys of the country into the hands of
the enemy; whilst he describes a mountainous frontier as a defile
difficult to pass, a temporary obstacl e which, once COII quared, presents
an advantage rather than a danger to the army which has succeeded
in seizing it. I n fact, the obstacle once surmounted, and the
war transferred to the plains, the chain of x~lountains may he
considered as a species of base upon which a n invader can always
retire and find an rzvailable refuge.
all great military writers agree in condemning what is styled
an inert or passive defence, and prefer the defence with returns
to the offensive, styled by Jomini, the defeizsive offensive, which
he asserts combines the advantages of the two systems. So long
as our frontier is limited t o the base of the mouutains, instead of
including the principal Passes, our action may be restricted to our
own territories, as, naturally, the first act of a11 enemy would be,
as I have already stated, t o close the Passes against us, hence, i n
order to enable us to t'ake the offensive, we must, in the first
instance, carry tllem by assault, a n operation likely to be atteoded
with great loss, and which might not, if they were scientifically
streogthened and defeilded by a resolute enemy, prove successful,
so that, against our mill, we might be colnpelled to act upon the
purely defeusive; i u the present war the oppositiou met wit11 in
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the Passes has been comparatively feeble, but me h a w no right t o
calculate upon our obtaining possession of them on such easy term s
in the event of a future campaign.
Taking all these facts into ons side ratio^ I think it can hardly
be asserted, as a purely military question, that our present
border-line offerg us a good and scientific frontier.
W i t h the Passes i n our possession, the power of taking the
initiative would rest i n our own hands, and, supposing the enemy
t o have fairly established himself in Afghanistan, and this would
be the first ~ t e pto be accomplished preparatory to an invasion of
India, whilst our own right flank would be, in a great measure,
secured, we could push forward a force on Candahar so a s t o
attack the extremity of his long line, 315 miles in extent, of
which the right would rest upon that city, and vhich, with
British posts a t Jellalabad and the Peiwar Pass threatelling his
left h e would possibly experience diaculty in re-inforcing, as he
must either detach corps of observation to watch those posts and
hold their garrisons in check, or else run the risk of having his
communications with the capital exposed to attack. Instead,
therefore, of having our frontier disquieted and the vhole of
India agitated, as would certainly be the case if we awaited
attack in our own frovinces, we should become the assailants, and
the contest would be transferred to the valley of the Turnuk. If
success attended our arms it would, in all probability, prove decisive, whilst even if we were compelled to retreat, we should
retire upon Quettnh, where re-inforcements would await us, and
enable us t o arrest the enemy's progress. Meanwhile, peace and
quietness would prevail throughout our own dominions and the
muss of our subjects would be in no way affected, a matter of the
greatest political importance.
> T h eforegoing views are, however, based upon the hypothesis
that a hostile Power had been permitted to occupy Afghanistan
and become master of its resources and of its strongholds, but with
Politicalor Consular Agents at Cabul, Candaharand Herat, and the
Frontier Passes in our possession, there is little probability of any
Foreign Power ever beiug permitted to take up such a position,
for, not only ought our political influence to be paramount throughout the country, but by our being able to anticipate any hostile
movement by an advance on Candahar, all hope on the part of
Russia of carrying out t o a successful issue any design for extellding her dominions in that direction must cease ; whilst, as
she would feel assured that, so long as she contented herself with
consolidating and improving the Asiatic Provinces at present under
her rule aud refrained from auy interference, either open or secret,
with a State which she should distinctly be informed is under our
protection, and of which the limits should be clearly defined, so
far from wishing to thwart her efforts we shonld view with satisfaction her attempt to bestow the advantages of good governmant

upon the races now under Ler control, the jealousy which has for
so many years past existed between the two nations might gradually subside, and, by degrees, the relations of amity, which so
long prevailed betveen them he restored. .
Although, with reference to pui.ely military considerations, the
~leighbourhoodof Dhaka might, in some respect, be deemed the
most suitable locality i n which to establish our extreme frontier
post beyond the Khyber, yet there are political advantanges
attendant upon our holding Jelallabad, which, upon the whole,
would make that the more preferable statiiin.
At Jelallabad, from our commanding pcjsition, we should enjoy
a n opportunity, through the adoption of a firm but conciliatory
attitude, of bringing under our influence the Ghilzais, one .of tlie
most powerful of the Afghan tribes ; we should be able to enter
into comnlunication with the Siah-posh Kafirs, a race which has,
I believe, generally expressed themselves favourably inclined
topards us; whilst, as suggested by me ten years ago, when
poin tin= out the probable results of the policy then pursued, should
in any treaty that may be concluded with the ruler of Afghanistan,
a clause be introduced, under which he would receive a fixed liberal
pqrneut iu lieu of all dues now levied upon our commerce and in return for a guarantee of protection to the lives
and property of our merchants, Jelallabad might become a
commercial entrep6t, from which the ramifications of our trade
might be exteuded throughout Central Asia, a measure that would
probably be more effectual tovards conciliating the Afghan tribes
and securing their good will than any diplomatic relations we
might enter into with their ruler. Asiatic Princes are proverbially
fickle, and owing to some fancied slight which he hopes t o avenge,
or to his cupidity being excited by some tempting offer froul
another Power, our ally of to-day may become our opponei~ttomorrow, but commercial intercourse once fairly established between
two nations, the bonds by which they are united are not easily
broken, and even a Sovereign may find himself powerless to
engage his people in a war which they may feel to be opposed to
their own interests.
Even in a mere military point of view, Jelallabad has some
advantages as an outpost, the garrison would co~nmandthe whole
of the valley, from the resources of which, until it was dislodged,
an enemy would therefore be excluded, whilst, before he could
besiege the town or oblige the British force to evacuate it by
threatening its line of communication, he would be compelled, after
crossing the Tezeen Pass, at an elevation of 8,200 feet, to traverse
upwards of 60 miles of most inhospitable aud barren country by
a road passing over long ranges of bleak hills, and through narrow and rugged defiles. If he employed a large force for the
purpose he mould experience considerable difficulty in carrying
with him the requisite provisions, ammunition, 6tc., whilst if he
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detached a small body there would be the risk of its being encountered and defeated asit debouched into the more open country,
in the vicinity of Gundamuk.
Although during the last two or three years of Lord Napier's
tenure of office in India, our political relations with the Ameer
Shere Ali had become somewhat strained, and apparently, Russian
diplonlacy n7as gradually acquiring undue influence at Cabul,
and taking possession of the ground which we ought to have
occupied, yet there was still hope that the Ameer might be induced to recognise the advantages that would accrue both to himself and to his people from a cordial alliance with the only Power
that could effectually interfere to prevent Afghanistan from becoming, in time, a Russian Province, hence no English statesman
or soldier could then have advocated an advance of our frontier,
or annexation of territory, that could only have been accomplished
s t the certain risk of alienating the ruler we were most desirous
of retaining as our ally, but," with the appearance of the Russian
Embassy at Cabul, and the refusal to receive the Mission under
Sir Neville Chamberlain, the aspect of affairs couipletely changed,
and the political question assumed an entirely new phase, it was
clear that we must abandon all expectation of successfully pursuing a coilciliatory policy towards the Ameer, and that, in the
event of ally rupture with Russia, his capital would become the
scene of intrigues for inciting the border tribes to make forays
into our districts, eve11 if we should not find his regular forces
arrayed against us. Hence, in self-defence, both for political and
military reasons, with reference, first, to the effect that any invasion of our territories might have upon our subjects, amongst
whom the slightest reverse on the Indus would, by clever intriguers,
be magnified into an overwhelming disaster., Secondly, to the
necessity for taking up a position which would admit of our
assuming, if necessary, the offensive, axid also enable us to oppose
every possible obstacle to the advance of an enemy, we were compelled to occupy the three main Passes, and thus circumstances
having placed in our hands the keys of the gates through which
invading columns must pass, i n the interests of the great dependency entrusted to our charge, and with the view of securing to
its people a complete immunity from the evils caused by continually recurring rumours of foreign invasion, and preserving for
them the full enjoyment of the blessings of peace, it is to be
hoped that we shall never restore them to any chief upon whose
fidelity we cannot fully depend ; but for the future retain
them in our own hands, and, :'although endeavouring to the
utmost of our power, to cultivate friendly relations and t o promote peaceful intercourse with our neighbours in Afghanistan,
at the same time coilvince them that, whilst coveting no extension of
territory and even fully prepared to afford them material aid and
support in preservir~g their independence, we sti-e strong enough

to hold our own and t o maktain the integrity of our Indian
Empire against all assailants.
With the Passes under our control, and our north-west frontier
strengthened so as t o effectually remove all alarm of any successful invasion from that quarter, by massing our troops upon important strategetical points instead of dispersing them in small
cantonments, a t the same time re-organizing our Native Army,
it might be possible to reduce our military expenditure without
impairing our military power, and, after an almost unbroken era
of forty years warfare, commencing from the appearance of a
Russian Emissary a t the Court of Dbost Mahorned, the Indian
Government, with impro~ed finances would be, at last, free to
turn its undivided attenti011 to the improvement of the moral a n d
material condition of the vast populations under its rule, and by
securing their welfare and happiness, prove Great Britain deserving
of the trust reposed in her, and of the high position she now
occupies on the Roll of Nations.
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